ConnectWise is investigating an active malware campaign in which attackers abused compromised ScreenConnect environments to push rogue remote-access clients into managed service provider networks S2. Huntress has confirmed six compromised MSPs and more than 286 affected endpoints across 47 downstream customer organizations as of 11 November 2026, with the number still climbing S1S3. The attackers are not exploiting a software flaw but hijacking the platform's own Run Command functionality to deploy unauthorized clients. For Swiss organisations that outsource remote support to MSPs, the campaign is a real-time test of recovery protocols when a trusted administrative channel turns hostile.
Run Command as the Attack Vector, Not a Software Flaw
Huntress assesses that the threat actor gained initial access through compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions rather than a vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself S1. Once inside an MSP's environment, the attackers used the Run Command feature - a legitimate administrative function meant for bulk remote management - to silently push rogue clients onto managed endpoints. Investigators have tied the activity to rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091, an attacker relay at 185.99.255[.]28, and command-and-control domains including newnewnew.gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork.homedns[.]org, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com and sc.payproofkit[.]com.
ConnectWise has reported that technician workstations themselves were compromised during interactive ScreenConnect sessions with already-infected customer devices S2. That detail matters: it means the compromise did not stay contained to a single customer environment but moved laterally through the MSP's own operators, turning each subsequent legitimate support session into a potential infection vector for the next client on the technician's list.
Sequential attacker-assigned tags on the rogue clients suggest additional MSPs may have been compromised well before the public disclosure, with earlier malicious activity linked to a rogue ScreenConnect client ID detected as far back as July 2026 S1. That gap between initial compromise and detection indicates a dwell period during which the threat actor could map victim environments and select targets before escalating to the broader campaign now under investigation.
Containment Measures and Their Practical Limits
As a precaution, ConnectWise disabled five third-party ScreenConnect extensions - Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, Password Link and RMM+ Password Link - across approximately 400 partner environments S1. These extensions extend ScreenConnect's native functionality with additional automation and credential-handling capabilities, which is precisely why they represent an attractive abuse surface once an attacker has operator-level access.
The containment has a hard limit, however: on-premises ScreenConnect customers must manually disable the five identified extensions themselves, because ConnectWise cannot push that change remotely to self-hosted instances S1. Any Swiss organisation or MSP running ScreenConnect on-premises rather than in ConnectWise's cloud should treat this as an immediate, unresolved exposure rather than an issue the vendor has already closed on their behalf.
Swiss Exposure: Concentrated Trust in a Single Remote-Access Platform
ScreenConnect and similar remote monitoring and management tools sit at the centre of how many MSPs deliver IT support to Swiss financial institutions, healthcare providers and critical infrastructure operators. That model is efficient precisely because it concentrates administrative access into a small number of platforms and operator accounts - which is exactly what this campaign exploited. Swiss organisations that outsource remote support are indirectly exposed the moment their MSP's technician credentials or sessions are compromised, even if the Swiss entity's own systems were never directly targeted.
Swiss MSPs are not bystanders here; they are direct targets in the same way the six already-compromised providers were. Credential hygiene on technician accounts, controls over which third-party extensions are permitted from the ScreenConnect marketplace, and isolation of technician workstations from general corporate IT all function as the practical boundary between a contained incident and a cascading one. This campaign demonstrates how a single remote-access platform, when concentrated across many downstream clients, turns a localized compromise into a multi-organization event.
What Swiss Teams Should Verify Before the Victim Count Climbs Further
Swiss CISOs should not wait for formal notification from an MSP to begin checking exposure. Internal logging and endpoint telemetry can be searched now against the published rogue client identifiers, the attacker relay, and the known command-and-control domains, regardless of whether an MSP has confirmed compromise. Any organisation that relies on ScreenConnect - directly or through a third-party MSP - should treat this as an active incident requiring verification rather than a historical advisory to file away.
Recovery protocols should assume that a compromised MSP session can propagate across every client that technician has touched. That means credential rotation for any shared or privileged access an MSP holds into Swiss environments, and scrutiny of recent remote sessions for signs of the rogue client deployment pattern described above. With victim numbers still rising and earlier, undetected compromise dating back months, the prudent posture for Swiss organisations is to assume indirect exposure until their MSP relationship has been explicitly cleared, and to use this incident to pressure-test how quickly that clearance can actually happen.
◆ Key Takeaway
Swiss teams using ScreenConnect on-premises must manually disable the five named third-party extensions today, since ConnectWise cannot do this remotely, and should simultaneously search logs for the published rogue client IDs and C2 domains regardless of MSP assurances.
- Search endpoint and network logs for the rogue ScreenConnect client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091, the attacker relay 185.99.255[.]28, and the listed command-and-control domains.
- Manually disable the Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, Password Link and RMM+ Password Link extensions on any on-premises ScreenConnect instance, since ConnectWise cannot remove them remotely.
- Contact every MSP with ScreenConnect access to your environment and request explicit confirmation of their compromise status, not just a general statement that they are monitoring the situation.
- Rotate credentials and reset active sessions for any MSP technician accounts or shared remote-access tooling with privileged access into Swiss systems.
- Review recent interactive remote sessions for signs that a technician workstation was used against an already-infected customer device before continuing to trust that session chain.
- Restrict which third-party ScreenConnect marketplace extensions are permitted in your own or your MSP's environment, given that extensions were the specific containment target in this campaign.
- Treat this incident as a live test of your MSP recovery protocol and document gaps in visibility or response speed for remediation before the next supply-chain compromise.